Biotechnology Obviousness in the Post-Genomic Era: KSR v. Teleflex and In re Kubin by Hays, Rebecca
Minnesota Journal of Law, Science & Technology 
Volume 10 Issue 2 Article 13 
2009 
Biotechnology Obviousness in the Post-Genomic Era: KSR v. 
Teleflex and In re Kubin 
Rebecca Hays 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/mjlst 
Recommended Citation 
Rebecca Hays, Biotechnology Obviousness in the Post-Genomic Era: KSR v. Teleflex and In re Kubin, 10 
MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 801 (2009). 
Available at: https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/mjlst/vol10/iss2/13 
The Minnesota Journal of Law, Science & Technology is published by the 
University of Minnesota Libraries Publishing. 
HAYS R.  Biotechnology Obviousness in the Post-Genomic Era: KSR v. Teleflex and In re 
Kubin.  MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 2009;10(2): 801-835. 
 
801 
Note 
Biotechnology Obviousness in the Post-Genomic Era:     
KSR v. Teleflex and In re Kubin 
Rebecca Hays* 
In its landmark decision KSR International Co. v. Teleflex, 
the Supreme Court announced new standards for obviousness 
determination in patent examination.1 KSR is the Court’s first 
substantive change to the obviousness standards originally set 
forth in Graham v. John Deere Co. over four decades ago.2 In 
KSR, the Court expanded the scope of the Graham analysis 
and criticized the long-standing teaching-suggestion-
motivation (TSM) test employed by the Federal Circuit to 
implement the holding of Graham.3 The Court held that while 
TSM is not inconsistent with Graham per se, it has been so 
rigidly applied by the Federal Circuit as to “be inconsistent 
with [the governing statute] and our precedents.”4 Under KSR, 
a proper TSM inquiry is not limited to prior art in an inventor’s 
particular field of endeavor or even analogous fields, and may 
consider whether the invention in question was “obvious to try” 
to a person of ordinary skill in the art,5 a standard that had 
                                                          
© 2009 Rebecca Hays. 
* J.D. Candidate, University of Minnesota Law School.  Ph.D. Genetics & 
Molecular Biology, Northwestern University 1999.  B.S. Biology, University 
of Minnesota 1993.  Dr. Hays held a National Institutes of Health 
Postdoctoral Fellowship at Washington University School of Medicine 
2000-2003, and served on the faculty of the University of Kansas, 
Department of Molecular Biosciences 2003-2007.  She has researched, 
lectured, and published in the areas of genetics and developmental 
biology. 
 1. KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex, Inc., 550 U.S. 398 (2007). 
 2. Graham v. John Deere Co. of Kan. City, 383 U.S. 1, 17–18 (1966). 
 3. TSM was first articulated by the Court of Customs and Patent 
Appeals (CCPA) in Application of Bergel, 292 F.2d 955, 956–57 (C.C.P.A. 
1961). The CCPA (1910-1982), is the predecessor to the Court of Appeals 
for the Federal Circuit (CAFC, Fed. Cir.)(1983-present). 
 4. KSR Int’l, 550 U.S. at 428. 
 5. Id. at 420. 
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been explicitly rejected by the Federal Circuit.6 
In Ex parte Kubin,7 the Board of Patent Appeals and 
Interferences (Board) made its first attempt to implement the 
holding of KSR in the context of a biotechnology patent. In that 
case, the Board affirmed the rejection of claims to nucleic acid 
sequences encoding the human NAIL protein.8 The claims were 
held obvious because the methods employed to isolate the 
sequences were known in the prior art and because the protein 
was known to exist in some form.9 Notably, however, the 
actual sequences claimed in Kubin were not disclosed by the 
prior art.10 
The Board held the Kubin rejections permissible under the 
new standards of KSR, in direct opposition to a Federal Circuit 
case that has set the standard for biotechnology obviousness 
for over a decade, In re Deuel.11 The Board cited language in 
KSR critical of the holding of Deuel, which it interpreted as 
overruling the decision.12 
In a much-anticipated decision, the Federal Circuit 
affirmed the Board’s rejection of the Kubin claims 
unreservedly.13 The court held in In re Kubin that because the 
methods employed by the claimants were well-known in the 
art, they enjoyed a reasonable expectation of success that 
rendered the end product obvious and unpatentable.14 This 
holding unequivocally overturns some aspects of Deuel and 
dramatically alters the patentability landscape of modern 
biotechnology. 
This Note addresses the current state of obviousness 
determination in modern biotechnology and the potential 
impact of KSR on the biotechnology industry as seen in In re 
                                                          
 6. See, e.g., In re Deuel, 51 F.3d 1552, 1559 (Fed. Cir. 1995). 
 7. Ex parte Kubin, 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1410 (B.P.A.I. 2007). 
 8. Natural killer cell activation-inducing ligand. See Marek Z. Kubin 
et al., Molecular Cloning and Biological Characterization of NK Cell 
Activation-Inducing Ligand, a Counterstructure for CD48, 29 EUR. J. 
IMMUNOLOGY 3466 (1999). 
 9. Ex parte Kubin, 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1414. 
 10. Id. at 1412–13. 
 11. In re Deuel, 51 F.3d 1552 (Fed. Cir. 1995). 
 12. Ex parte Kubin, 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1414. 
 13. In re Kubin, No. 2008-1184, 2009 WL 877646 at *1 (Fed. Cir. Apr. 
3, 2009). 
 14. Id. at *9–10. 
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Kubin. Section I discusses the evolution of obviousness 
doctrine, key Federal Circuit precedents relating to innovations 
in biotechnology, and the holdings of KSR, Ex parte Kubin, and 
In re Kubin. Section II discusses functional considerations in 
biotechnology obviousness and the relevance of KSR to the 
industry as a whole. It addresses the sophisticated level of 
ordinary skill in the so-called Post-Genomic Era,15 and 
describes ways in which generic obviousness standards, such 
as those articulated in KSR, are fundamentally incompatible 
with realities of biology. The Note concludes by advocating for 
industry-tolerant obviousness standards that promote the 
public interest in biotechnology research while setting 
reasonable standards for patentability. 
I. OBVIOUSNESS THEN AND NOW 
A. EVOLUTION OF MODERN OBVIOUSNESS STANDARDS: 
HOTCHKISS, GRAHAM, KSR 
The statutory requirement for nonobviousness of a novel 
invention is set forth in 35 U.S.C. § 103, which bars the grant 
of a patent where the differences between the invention and 
the prior art are such that “the subject matter as a whole 
would have been obvious at the time the invention was made 
to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which said 
subject matter pertains.”16 Enacted in 1952,17 § 103 is a 
codification of the judicial doctrine of nonobviousness first 
articulated by the Supreme Court in Hotchkiss v. Greenwood.18 
In that case, the Court held that irrespective of the 
requirements for novelty and utility,19 the standard for 
                                                          
 15. Life science researchers coined the term post-genomic in the late-
1990s in reference to the advanced state of modern genetics. Initially, the 
term referred specifically to the completion of genome sequencing for 
several genetic model organisms. In the last several years the term has 
taken on a broader meaning, referring generally to the high level of 
sophistication of modern life science research and the vast resources 
available to researchers. See generally Sydney Brenner, Genomics: The 
End of the Beginning, 287 SCIENCE 2173 (2000); Gerald M. Rubin et al., 
Comparative Genomics of the Eukaryotes, 287 SCIENCE 2204 (2000). 
 16. United States Patent Act, 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) (2006). 
 17. Id. 
 18. Hotchkiss v. Greenwood, 52 U.S. 248, 265–67 (1850). 
 19. Utility and novelty standards are set forth in 35 U.S.C. §§ 101–
102. Section 101 provides for the grant of a patent to “[w]hoever invents 
or discovers any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or 
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patentability of an invention is ingenuity and not ordinary 
skill.20 
The general holding of Hotchkiss supports sound public 
policy considerations. Enforcing a minimal standard for 
nonobviousness prevents inventors from obtaining rights to 
products already in the public domain by adding trivial 
modifications.21 It also ensures that the exclusive rights 
conferred to the patent holder are proportional to the public 
benefit gained by the inventor’s contribution to the public store 
of knowledge—a classic quid pro quo.22 The ingenuity of 
invention standard of Hotchkiss proved an inadequate 
measure, however, as it was too ambiguous and difficult to 
apply uniformly. As the Court later reflected, “[t]he truth is the 
word [invention] cannot be defined in such manner as to afford 
any substantial aid in determining whether a particular device 
involves an exercise of the inventive faculty or not.”23 The 
Court recognized that the Hotchkiss standard was sufficiently 
vague to spur “a large variety of opinions as to its meaning 
both in the Patent Office, in the courts, and at the bar.”24 
Indeed, the Court itself struggled to devise a reasonable 
                                                          
composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof . . . .” 
35 U.S.C. § 101 (2006). Section 102 sets forth extensive guidelines for 
determination of the novelty of an invention relative to the prior art. § 102. 
 20. Hotchkiss, 52 U.S. at 267. 
[U]nless more ingenuity and skill in applying the old 
method . . . were required . . . than were possessed by an ordinary 
mechanic acquainted with the business, there was an absence of 
that degree of skill and ingenuity which constitute essential 
elements of every invention. In other words, the improvement is 
the work of the skilful mechanic, not that of the inventor. 
Id. (holding invalid a patent substituting the use of porcelain or clay for 
wood or metal in the manufacture of doorknobs). 
 21. See, e.g., Graham v. John Deere Co. of Kan. City, 383 U.S. 1, 6 
(1966) (“Moreover, Congress may not authorize the issuance of patents 
whose effects are to remove existent knowledge from the public domain, or 
to restrict free access to materials already available.”); see also Bonito 
Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 146 (1989) 
(quoting the above passage from Graham). 
 22. See, e.g., United States v. Dubilier Condenser Corp., 289 U.S. 178, 
186–87 (1933), amended by 289 U.S. 706 (1933) (“[The inventor] may 
keep his invention secret and reap its fruits indefinitely. In consideration 
of its disclosure and the consequent benefit to the community, the patent 
is granted.”). 
 23. Graham, 383 U.S. at 11 (alteration in original) (quoting McClain v. 
Ortmayer, 141 U.S. 419, 427 (1891)). 
 24. Id. at 12. 
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standard for obviousness after Hotchkiss, at one time adopting 
the controversial and highly subjective test that inventions not 
created in a “flash of genius” do not meet the requirements for 
patentability.25 
Following Congressional enactment of § 103 mandating an 
objective standard for nonobviousness,26 the Court fashioned 
the modern test of Graham v. John Deere Co. of Kansas City, 
issued more than a century after Hotchkiss.27 Under Graham, 
obviousness would be determined through characterization of 
1) the scope and content of the prior art, 2) the differences 
between the prior art and the claims, and 3) the ordinary level 
of skill in the pertinent art.28 The Court also identified 
secondary considerations that may suggest nonobviousness, 
including commercial success, long-felt, unresolved needs, and 
the failure of others in the same endeavor.29 These 
considerations would be particularly helpful, the Court felt, in 
avoiding the pitfalls of hindsight bias—“the temptation to read 
into the prior art the teachings of the invention in issue”30—
which had arisen in other post-Hotchkiss cases.31 
The Court recognized that irrespective of its formal 
pronouncements in Graham, uniform application of the 
nonobviousness test would require further development of the 
doctrine in the lower courts.32 In fact, the Court of Customs 
                                                          
 25. Cuno Eng’g Corp. v. Automatic Devices Corp., 314 U.S. 84, 91 
(1941), amended by 314 U.S. 587 (1942) (“That is to say the new device, 
however useful it may be, must reveal the flash of creative genius not 
merely the skill of the calling. If it fails, it has not established its right to a 
private grant on the public domain.”). The “flash of genius” standard was 
overturned by § 103, which states that “[p]atentability shall not be 
negatived by the manner in which the invention was made.” 35 U.S.C. 
§ 103(a) (2006). 
 26. See Dann v. Johnston, 425 U.S. 219, 225–26 (1976) (“[I]t was only 
in 1952 that Congress, in the interest of ‘uniformity and definiteness,’ 
articulated the requirement in a statute . . . .”) (quoting S. REP. NO. 1979, 
at 6 (1952); H.R. REP. NO. 1923, at 7 (1952)). 
 27. Graham, 383 U.S. at 3 (invalidating a patent covering a “Clamp for 
vibrating Shank Plows” as an obvious modification of prior art elements). 
 28. Id. at 17–18. 
 29. Id. 
 30. Id. at 36. 
 31. See, e.g., Diamond Rubber Co. v. Consol. Rubber Tire Co., 220 
U.S. 428, 435 (1911) (“Knowledge after the event is always easy, and 
problems once solved present no difficulties, indeed, may be represented 
as never having had any . . . .”). 
 32. Graham, 383 U.S. at 18. 
This is not to say, however, that there will not be difficulties in 
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and Patent Appeals (C.C.P.A.) had already devised a method to 
implement the holding of Hotchkiss. The teaching-suggestion-
motivation (TSM) standard, first articulated five years before 
Graham,33 became the cornerstone of obviousness 
determination in the lower courts. Under the TSM test, an 
invention is obvious where there is a teaching, suggestion, or 
motivation in the analogous prior art to make the product in 
question.34 References are selected for their relevance to the 
subject matter based on the judgment of a person of ordinary 
skill in the art, but are not limited to explicit statements.35 
Motivation may be implicit in the prior art as a whole, or 
suggested by the nature of the problem addressed by the 
invention.36 In the Federal Circuit’s view, this test “picks up 
where the analogous art test leaves off and informs the 
Graham analysis,”37 lending both direction and scope to the 
inquiry.38 
Use of the Federal Circuit’s TSM test in the lower courts 
went largely unchallenged for over four decades. In KSR 
International Co. v. Teleflex Inc., the Court made its first 
substantive changes to Graham, broadening the scope of the 
relevant prior art and rejecting the Federal Circuit’s TSM 
application as impermissibly narrow.39 
The dispute in KSR involved rights to an adjustable 
automobile pedal featuring electronic sensing devices.40 The 
individual elements of the invention were present in the prior 
                                                          
applying the nonobviousness test. What is obvious is not a 
question upon which there is likely to be uniformity of thought in 
every given factual context. The difficulties, however, are 
comparable to those encountered daily by the courts . . . and 
should be amenable to a case-by-case development. 
Id. 
 33. Application of Bergel, 292 F.2d 955, 956–57 (C.C.P.A. 1961). 
 34. See, In re Kahn, 441 F.3d 977, 986–87 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (“Although 
our predecessor court was the first to articulate the motivation-
suggestion-teaching test, a related test—the the analogous art test—has 
long been part of the primary Graham analysis articulated by the 
Supreme Court.”) (citing Dann v. Johnston, 425 U.S. 219, 227–29 (1976)). 
 35. Id. at 987. 
 36. Id. at 987–88. 
 37. Alza Corp. v. Mylan Labs., 464 F.3d 1286, 1290 (Fed. Cir. 2006) 
(quoting Kahn, 441 F. 3d at 987). 
 38. See id. at 1290–91. 
 39. KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex, Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 418–19 (2007). 
 40. Id. at 407–08. 
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art, but the combination of elements had not been previously 
disclosed.41 The Federal Circuit reversed the finding of patent 
invalidity for failure of the lower court to properly apply the 
TSM test.42 The court recognized that the elements of the 
invention were known in the industry, but held that the 
district court failed to identify a motivation in the prior art that 
would lead a person of ordinary skill in the art to combine the 
elements.43 
In reversing the Federal Circuit’s holding, the Supreme 
Court criticized its application of the TSM test as a “rigid rule 
that limits the obviousness inquiry.”44 The Court did not 
consider the test fundamentally at odds with Graham, only the 
manner in which the Federal Circuit had applied it in this and 
other cases.45 Specifically, the Court held it is error to limit the 
Graham inquiry to the particular problem the inventor is trying 
to solve or prior art addressing the same issue, stating that, 
“[u]nder the correct analysis, any need or problem known in 
the field . . . can provide a reason for combining the elements 
in the manner claimed.”46 Moreover, courts should not assume 
that inventors will be guided only by prior art elements 
directed to the particular problem they are working on, but 
should regard the person of ordinary skill in the art as having 
the “ordinary creativity” to assemble even unrelated prior art 
“like pieces of a puzzle.”47 The Court minimized the Federal 
                                                          
 41. See id. at 408–09. 
 42. Teleflex, Inc. v. KSR Int’l. Co., 119 F. App’x 282, 286 (Fed. Cir. 
2005), rev’d, 550 U.S. 398 (2007). 
 43. Id. at 288. 
[The district court invalidated the patent] without making 
“finding[s] as to the specific understanding or principle within the 
knowledge of a skilled artisan that would have motivated one with 
no knowledge of [the] invention to make the combination in the 
manner claimed.” Under our case law, whether based on the 
nature of the problem to be solved, the express teachings of the 
prior art, or the knowledge of one of ordinary skill in the art, the 
district court was required to make specific findings as to whether 
there was a suggestion or motivation to combine . . . . 
Id. (second and third alterations in original) (citation omitted) (quoting In 
re Kotzab, 217 F.3d 1365, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2000)). 
 44. KSR Int’l, 550 U.S. at 419. 
 45. Id. (“There is no necessary inconsistency between the idea 
underlying the TSM test and the Graham analysis. But when a court 
transforms the general principle into a rigid rule that limits the 
obviousness inquiry . . . it errs.”). 
 46. Id. at 420 (emphasis added). 
 47. Id. at 420–21. 
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Circuit’s concern that poorly-defined obviousness criteria may 
give way to hindsight bias,48 and called for a “common sense” 
approach to obviousness determination, including 
consideration of what may be obvious to try in a given field of 
endeavor.49 As the Court explained: 
The same constricted analysis led the Court of Appeals to 
conclude, in error, that a patent claim cannot be proved obvious 
merely by showing that the combination of elements was “obvious 
to try.” When there is a design need or market pressure to solve a 
problem and there are a finite number of identified, predictable 
solutions, a person of ordinary skill has good reason to pursue 
the known options within his or her technical grasp. If this leads 
to the anticipated success, it is likely the product not of 
innovation but of ordinary skill and common sense. In that 
instance the fact that a combination was obvious to try might 
show that it was obvious under § 103.50 
Ultimately, the Court called for the Federal Circuit to apply 
a “flexible” TSM test that considers common knowledge and 
common sense to assess obviousness in light of prior art.51 
                                                          
 48. Id. at 421. 
The Court of Appeals, finally, drew the wrong conclusion from the 
risk of courts and patent examiners falling prey to hindsight bias. 
A factfinder should be aware, of course, of the distortion caused 
by hindsight bias and must be cautious of arguments reliant 
upon ex post reasoning. Rigid preventative rules that deny 
factfinders recourse to common sense, however, are neither 
necessary under our case law nor consistent with it. 
Id. (internal citation omitted). 
 49. The Court called for the use of a common sense approach to 
obviousness determination no fewer than four times throughout the 
opinion: “Although common sense directs one to look with care at a patent 
application that claims . . . the combination of two known devices . . . it 
can be important to identify a reason that would have prompted a person 
of ordinary skill in the relevant field to combine the elements in the way 
the claimed new invention does.” Id. at 418; “[c]ommon sense teaches, 
however, that familiar items may have obvious uses beyond their primary 
purposes, and in many cases a person of ordinary skill will be able to fit 
the teachings of multiple patents together like pieces of a puzzle . . . . If 
this leads to the anticipated success, it is likely the product not of 
innovation but of ordinary skill and common sense.” Id. at 420; “[r]igid 
preventative rules that deny factfinders recourse to common sense, 
however, are neither necessary under our case law nor consistent with it.” 
Id. at 421. 
 50. Id. at 421 (internal citation omitted). 
 51. Id. at 421–22. The Court noted that the Federal Circuit had begun 
to implement a more flexible test prior to the writing of KSR. Id. (citing 
DyStar Textilfarben GmbH & Co Deutschland KG v. C.H. Patrick Co., 464 
F.3d 1356, 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2006); Alza Corp. v. Mylan Labs., Inc., 464 
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The Federal Circuit acknowledged the edict of KSR in 
Black & Decker, Inc. v. Robert Bosch Tool Corp., where it 
defended the TSM test, holding that “the teaching, suggestion, 
motivation test remains good law for obviousness, only a rigid 
application of that test is problematic.”52 The court announced 
a reformulation of the test in Ortho-McNeil Pharmaceuticals v. 
Mylan Laboratories: 
The TSM test, flexibly applied, merely assures that the 
obviousness test proceeds on the basis of evidence—teachings, 
suggestions (a tellingly broad term), or motivations (an equally 
broad term)—that arise before the time of invention as the statute 
requires. As KSR requires, those teachings, suggestions, or 
motivations need not always be written references but may be 
found within the knowledge and creativity of ordinarily skilled 
artisans.53 
Notwithstanding this change, the court reiterated its view 
on the pitfalls of hindsight bias, which had been trivialized in 
KSR,54 stating that “a flexible TSM test remains the primary 
guarantor against a non-statutory hindsight analysis.”55 The 
court was also quick to re-tool the KSR standard for 
predictability in obviousness determination. Recall that KSR 
calls for a finding of obviousness where there is a “finite 
number of identified, predictable solutions.”56 The Federal 
Circuit version limits the KSR standard to an “easily traversed, 
small and finite number of alternatives,”57 a standard 
specifically tailored to accommodate the biotechnology and 
pharmaceutical industries, which the Federal Circuit has long 
held to be unpredictable arts.58 
The impact of KSR on biotechnology patents depends 
largely on whether it is interpreted as overruling In re Deuel, a 
key Federal Circuit decision that centered on the inter-
                                                          
F.3d 1286, 1291 (Fed. Cir. 2006)). 
 52. Black & Decker, Inc. v. Robert Bosch Tool Corp., 260 F. App’x 
284, 290 (Fed. Cir. 2008). 
 53. Ortho-McNeil Pharm., Inc. v. Mylan Labs., Inc., 520 F.3d 1358, 
1365 (Fed. Cir. 2008). 
 54. See supra note 49 and accompanying text. 
 55. Ortho-McNeil, 520 F.3d at 1364. 
 56. KSR Int’l, 550 U.S. at 421. 
 57. Ortho-McNeil, 520 F.3d at 1364. 
 58. See, e.g., Eisai Co. v. Dr. Reddy’s Labs., Ltd., 533 F.3d 1353, 1359 
(Fed. Cir. 2008) (“To the extent an art is unpredictable, as the chemical 
arts often are, KSR’s focus on these ‘identified, predictable solutions’ may 
present a difficult hurdle because potential solutions are less likely to be 
genuinely predictable.”). 
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Fig. 1  Schematic diagram of transcription and 
translation. Double-stranded DNA is transcribed into an 
mRNA intermediate, which is translated into a polypeptide 
sequence. Three base-pair codons are separated in this 
illustration for clarity. Note that the amino acid leucine 
(Leu) is encoded by two different codons on the level of 
DNA (GAC and AAC) and mRNA (CUG and UUG). This is
known as degeneracy of the genetic code. See also, Fig. 2 
and accompanying discussion. 
relatedness of DNA, RNA, and proteins.59 Before discussing the 
holdings of those cases, a short biology refresher is in order. 
B. A GENETICS PRIMER 
The term genome refers to an organism’s full complement 
of genetic material.60 It is composed of deoxyribonucleic acid  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
 59. In re Deuel, 51 F.3d 1552 (Fed. Cir. 1995). 
 60. See generally ANTHONY GRIFFITHS ET AL., INTRODUCTION TO GENETIC 
ANALYSIS 295–349 (9th ed. 2008) (providing an undergraduate-level 
explanation of DNA structure and gene expression); John M. Conley & 
Roberte Makowski, Rethinking the Product of Nature Doctrine as a Barrier 
to Biotechnology Patents in the United States—And Perhaps Europe as 
Well, 13 INFO. & COMM. TECH. L. 3, 8–11 (2004) (presenting an advanced-
level review in the context of a discussion on patentable subject matter); 
see also, In re O’Farrell, 853 F.2d 894, 895–99 (Fed. Cir. 1988) 
(discussing basic recombinant DNA technology). 
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(DNA), and is the storehouse of biological information 
necessary for all aspects of an organism’s existence, including 
embryonic development, growth, maturation, and 
reproduction. DNA is a linear molecule made up of repeating 
sub-units called bases: adenine (A), cytosine (C), guanine (G), 
thymine (T). It commonly exists in the form of a double-
stranded molecule—a double helix—in which two linear DNA 
molecules twist around each other in a right-handed spiral. 
The positioning of DNA strands relative to each other is 
controlled by complementary base pairing, which is the result 
of interactions between bases on opposing strands. The 
chemical nature of the bases is such that adenine on one 
strand always pairs with thymine on the other (A-T), and 
cytosine on one strand always pairs with guanine on the other 
(C-G). Thus, any given position on a molecule of double-
stranded DNA is referred to as a base-pair (Fig. 1). 
The term gene refers to a discrete unit of DNA, and is on 
the order of 103 base pairs in length.61 Many genes encode the 
proteins that comprise cells and tissues. That is, they carry all 
of the information—in code—necessary to make the protein 
product. Proteins are generated through a two-step process 
called transcription and translation (Fig. 1). In transcription, 
DNA serves as a template for the synthesis of ribonucleic acid 
(RNA), a related but distinct molecule. This particular type of 
RNA (there are many) is referred to as messenger RNA (mRNA). 
mRNA is a single stranded molecule also composed of 
repeating bases, in which thymine is replaced with the related 
base uracil (U). The order of bases in mRNA is specified by the 
order of bases on the DNA template strand. Thus, through 
mRNA synthesis, the code of DNA is transcribed into an 
intermediate molecule.  mRNA derives its name from its role in 
protein synthesis. It literally carries the DNA message from the 
site of transcription to the site of protein assembly. 
In translation, mRNA serves as a template for the 
assembly of amino acids into a polypeptide or protein. 
Individual amino acids are specified by nucleic acid sequences 
three base-pairs in length, called codons, present in both the 
                                                          
 61. The human genome contains approximately three billion base-
pairs of DNA encoding an estimated 20,000-25,000 genes. Human 
Genome Program, U.S. Dep’t of Energy Office of Sci., The Science Behind 
the Human Genome Project (Mar. 26, 2008), 
http://www.ornl.gov/sci/techresources/Human_Genome/project/info.sh
tml. 
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Fig. 2  Implications of degeneracy of the genetic code on 
the predictability of gene sequences. For simplicity, the 
mRNA intermediate is not shown. A. Reading forward, from 
DNA to protein, is straightforward. The sequence of amino 
acids in the protein product is predicable from the DNA 
sequence alone. B. The converse is not true. Because most 
amino acids are specified by more than one codon, it is not 
possible to predict the gene sequence from knowledge of the 
amino acid sequence alone. 
DNA and mRNA. Together, the processes of transcription and 
translation are referred to as gene expression. Genes are said 
to be expressed when the DNA is transcribed and the gene 
product is made. Generally speaking, the cells of a given 
organism all carry the same complement of DNA—the same 
genes. However, not all cells express all genes. During 
development and throughout life, cells assume different fates, 
with different properties and functions, through differential 
gene expression. For example, liver cells express liver-specific 
genes, while muscle cells express muscle-specific genes. 
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One final point about protein translation relates to the 
specificity of genetic coding for amino acids. As described 
above, individual amino acids are specified by nucleic acid 
sequences three base-pairs in length—codons. However, 
permutation of the four DNA bases generates more codons (43 
= 64 possible three-base-pair sequences) than there are amino 
acids (20). For this reason, most amino acids are specified by 
more than one codon. Some are specified by as many as six 
codons. This is referred to as degeneracy of the genetic code, 
and it is the punch line of this biology primer. 
Forward reading of the genetic code—DNA to protein—is 
straightforward. The mRNA and protein sequences are fully 
predictable from the DNA sequence alone (Fig. 2A). The 
converse, however, is categorically untrue. Due to degeneracy 
of the code, the amino acid sequence of a protein does not give 
a read of the parent gene sequence. Consider the number of 
possible codon combinations for the simple peptide shown in 
Fig. 2B, in which three of the five amino acids are specified by 
six different codons.62 Most proteins are much larger than this 
example, with a staggering number of potential coding 
sequences.63 
C. FEDERAL CIRCUIT PRECEDENTS: IN RE BELL AND IN RE DEUEL 
Two Federal Circuit decisions in the mid-1990s, In re 
Bell64 and In re Deuel,65 set the standard for obviousness in 
genetics innovation. In Bell, the claims were directed to nucleic 
acid sequences (both DNA and RNA) encoding human insulin-
like growth factors (IGF) I and II.66 The Board held the claims 
                                                          
 62. Care to try your hand? There are 1728 possible coding sequences 
for this short peptide. 
 63. See, for example, In re Bell, 991 F.2d 781, 784 (Fed. Cir. 1993), in 
which the claimant calculated 1036 potential coding sequences for insulin-
like growth factor, a 79 amino acid protein. 
 64. In re Bell, 991 F.2d at 781. 
 65. In re Deuel, 51 F.3d 1552 (Fed. Cir. 1995). 
 66. In re Bell, 991 F.2d at 782 n.3. Claim 25 is representative: 
A composition comprising nucleic acid molecules containing a 
human sequence encoding insulin-like growth factor (hIGF) 
substantially free of nucleic acid molecules not containing said 
hIGF sequence, wherein said hIGF sequence is selected from the 
group consisting of: (a) 5 ‘-GGA CCG . . . wherein U can also be T; 
(b) 5 ‘-GCU UAC . . . wherein U can also be T; (c) nucleic acid 
sequences complementary to (a) or (b); and (d) fragments of (a), (b) 
or (c) that are at least 18 bases in length and which will 
selectively hybridize to human genomic DNA encoding hIGF. 
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prima facie obvious over the combined teachings of a U.S. 
patent to Weissman67 and two scientific publications disclosing 
the amino acid sequences of the growth factors.68 The 
Weissman patent taught the use of nucleic acid probes to 
isolate genes of interest, wherein the sequence of the probe 
encodes the relevant protein and is therefore complementary to 
the relevant mRNA.69 The disclosure specified that the probes 
should be designed using unique codons to circumvent 
degeneracy of the genetic code, and described use of the 
method to isolate a gene unrelated to IGF.70 The Board 
reasoned that because of the natural relatedness of proteins 
and their corresponding genes, knowledge of a protein’s amino 
acid sequence renders the gene sequence obvious.71 The Board 
also held that the Weissman patent illustrated that the 
ordinary artisan would know how to use a protein sequence to 
isolate the corresponding gene.72 
In reversing the Board’s rejection of the Bell claims, the 
Federal Circuit emphasized that because of degeneracy of the 
code, knowledge of a protein sequence does not render a gene 
sequence obvious, stating: 
It may be true that, knowing the structure of the protein, one can 
use the genetic code to hypothesize possible structures for the 
corresponding gene and that one thus has the potential for 
obtaining that gene. However, because of the degeneracy of the 
genetic code, there are a vast number of nucleotide sequences 
that might code for a specific protein. In the case of IGF, Bell has 
argued without contradiction that the [prior art] amino acid 
sequences could be coded for by more than 1036 different 
nucleotide sequences, only a few of which are the human 
sequences that Bell now claims. Therefore, given the nearly 
infinite number of possibilities suggested by the prior art, and the 
failure of the cited prior art to suggest which of those possibilities 
is the human sequence, the claimed sequences would not have 
                                                          
Id. at 782 n.3. 
 67. Method for Cloning Genes, U.S. Patent No. 4,394,443 (filed Dec. 
18, 1980) (issued July 19, 1983). 
 68. In re Bell, 991 F.2d at 783; Ernst Rinderknecht and René E. 
Humbel, The Amino Acid Sequence of Human Insulin-Like Growth Factor I 
and Its Structural Homology with Proinsulin, 253 J. BIOLOGICAL CHEMISTRY 
2769 (1978); Ernst Rinderknecht and René E. Humbel, Primary Structure 
of Human Insulin-Like Growth Factor II, 89 FEBS LETTERS 283 (1978). 
 69. In re Bell, 991 F.2d at 783. 
 70. Id. 
 71. Id. 
 72. Id. 
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been obvious.73 
The court explicitly reserved judgment on whether the 
converse is also true. That is, whether knowledge of a gene 
sequence renders the corresponding amino acid sequence 
obvious.74 The court also rejected the notion that use of a 
generally known method to isolate gene sequences renders the 
sequences themselves obvious.75 
In Deuel, the claims were directed to genomic DNA and 
cDNA76 sequences coding for heparin-binding growth factors 
isolated from human and bovine placental tissue.77 The Board 
held the claims obvious over the combined teachings of a 
European patent application by Bohlen78 and a molecular 
biology laboratory manual by Maniatis.79 The Bohlen reference 
                                                          
 73. Id. at 784. 
 74. Id. at 784 n.6 (“We also express no opinion concerning the reverse 
proposition, that knowledge of the structure of a DNA, e.g., a cDNA, might 
make a coded protein obvious.”). 
 75. Id. at 785 (“[T]he issue is the obviousness of the claimed 
compositions, not of the method by with they are made.”) (citing In re 
Thorpe, 777 F.2d 695, 697 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (emphasis added)). 
 76. A cDNA, or complementary DNA, is not a naturally occurring 
molecule. It is an engineered DNA prepared by reverse-transcribing mRNA 
isolated from cells or tissue. cDNAs encode for the same products as their 
corresponding genomic sequences and are used to achieve gene 
expression outside of its normal context (e.g., in bacteria). See generally J. 
SAMBROOK ET AL., MOLECULAR CLONING: A LABORATORY MANUAL (3d. ed. 
2001) (a comprehensive guide to nucleic acid cloning and expression of 
cloned genes in vitro). 
 77. In re Deuel, 51 F.3d 1552, 1554 (Fed. Cir. 1995). Claims 4-7 were 
appealed: 
4. A purified and isolated DNA sequence consisting of a sequence 
encoding human heparin binding growth factor of 168 amino 
acids having the following amino acid sequence: Met Gln 
Ala . . . [remainder of 168 amino acid sequence].  
5. The purified and isolated cDNA of human heparin-binding 
growth factor having the following nucleotide sequence: 
GTCAAAGGCA . . . [remainder of 961 nucleotide sequence].  
6. A purified and isolated DNA sequence consisting of a sequence 
encoding bovine heparin binding growth factor of 168 amino acids 
having the following amino acid sequence: Met Gln 
Thr . . . [remainder of 168 amino acid sequence].  
7. The purified and isolated cDNA of bovine heparin-binding 
growth factor having the following nucleotide sequence: 
GAGTGGAGAG . . . [remainder of 1196 nucleotide sequence]. 
Id.at 1555 (alterations in original). 
 78. European Patent No. 89,101,187 (filed Jan. 24, 1989). 
 79. In re Deuel, 51 F.3d at 1557; T. MANIATIS ET AL., MOLECULAR 
CLONING: A LABORATORY MANUAL 353–61 (1982) (describing a protocol for 
screening bacteriophage libraries in Escherichia coli). 
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disclosed three protein growth factors known only as heparin-
binding mitogens, and reported a partial amino acid sequence 
for each.80 Bohlen taught explicitly that the proteins were 
brain-specific, and did not teach any details of the 
corresponding genomic DNA or cDNAs.81 The Maniatis 
reference taught general methods for the isolation of gene 
sequences, including the method used by the inventor.82 The 
Board held that a person of ordinary skill in the art could have 
designed nucleic acid probes based on the amino acid 
sequences disclosed in Bohlen, and then used the general 
methods of Maniatis to isolate the genes in question.83 The 
Board considered it irrelevant that the Bohlen reference taught 
away84 from the Deuel claims by reporting that the proteins 
were brain-specific, and that the DNA sequences claimed 
encoded the full-length proteins, not just the portions 
disclosed by Bohlen.85 
The Federal Circuit reversed the finding of obviousness, 
citing its holdings in Bell.86 The court held that while general 
aspects of the proteins may have been obvious in light of the 
Bohlen reference (e.g. the general class and function of the 
proteins), the precise DNA sequences claimed were not obvious 
and could not have been predicted based on the amino acid 
sequence due to redundancy of the genetic code.87 The court 
                                                          
 80. In re Deuel, 51 F.3d at 1555–56. Bohlen reported the N-terminal 
nineteen amino acids of each protein. Id. at 1556. 
 81. Id. at 1556. 
 82. Id. at 1555–56. The claimant screened human and bovine cDNA 
libraries using degenerate DNA probes encoding the N-terminal twenty-
five amino acids of the proteins, which he had determined himself from 
the isolated proteins. Id. at 1555. 
 83. Id. at 1557. 
 84. A reference is said to teach away from an invention when it would 
discourage a person of skill in the art from pursuing a technology or a 
particular approach to innovation. In re Gurley, 27 F.3d 551, 553 (Fed. 
Cir. 1994). 
 85. In re Deuel, 51 F.3d at 1556–57. 
 86. Id. at 1559. 
 87. Id. at 1558. 
[O]ne could not have conceived the [claimed sequences] based on 
the teachings in the cited prior art because, until the claimed 
molecules were actually isolated and purified, it would have been 
highly unlikely for one of ordinary skill in the art to contemplate 
what was ultimately obtained. What cannot be contemplated or 
conceived cannot be obvious. 
Id. 
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also reiterated its view that the existence of general methods 
for gene isolation do not render obvious claimed sequences, 
even where knowledge of the methods is coupled with 
knowledge of the protein sequence.88 In the words of the court, 
“‘obvious to try’ has long been held not to constitute 
obviousness.”89 
D. EX PARTE KUBIN AND IN RE KUBIN 
The pre-KSR standard for biotechnology obviousness was 
grounded in functional aspects of the biology involved. The 
Federal Circuit appreciated the implications of genetic 
redundancy, and inventor reliance on proven biochemical 
methods was not fatal to a claim of non-obviousness.90 If In re 
Kubin is any indication, however, KSR may have changed all 
that.91 
The claims in Kubin were directed to nucleic acid 
sequences encoding the human NAIL,92 a protein involved in 
the regulation of immune responses.93 In Ex parte Kubin, the 
Board held the claims obvious94 over the combined teachings 
of a U.S. patent to Valiante,95 a molecular biology laboratory 
manual by Sambrook,96 and a scientific publication by Mathew 
                                                          
 88. Id. at 1559 (“Thus, even if, as the examiner stated, the existence of 
general cloning techniques, coupled with knowledge of a protein’s 
structure, might have provided motivation to prepare a cDNA or made it 
obvious to prepare a cDNA, that does not necessarily make obvious a 
particular claimed cDNA.”). 
 89. Id. (citing In re O’Farrell, 853 F.2d 894, 903 (Fed. Cir. 1988)). 
 90. See generally In re Deuel, 51 F.3d at 1552; In re Bell, 991 F.2d 781 
(Fed. Cir 1993). 
 91. In re Kubin, No. 2008-1184, 2009 WL 877646, at *7–10 (Fed. Cir. 
Apr. 3, 2009). 
 92. Claim 73 is representative: “An isolated nucleic acid molecule 
comprising a polynucleotide encoding a polypeptide at least 80% identical 
to amino acids 22-221 of SEQ ID NO:2, wherein the polypeptide binds 
CD48.” Ex parte Kubin, 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1410, 1412 (BPAI 2007). 
 93. See Kubin et al., supra note 8. 
 94. The claimants also appealed the rejection of claims under § 112, 
¶ 1 , 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2006), for deficiencies in enablement and written 
description. Ex parte Kubin, 83 U.S. P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1415. The Board 
reversed the examiner’s rejection for lack of enablement and affirmed 
rejection for insufficient written description. Id. at 1417. 
 95. Human Cytotoxic Lymphocyte Signal Transduction Surface 
Protein (P38) and Monoclonal Antibodies Thereto, U.S. Patent No. 
5,688,690 (filed Sept. 16, 1994) (issued Nov. 18, 1997). 
 96. J. SAMBROOK ET AL., MOLECULAR CLONING: A LABORATORY MANUAL 
2.43–2.84 (2d. ed. 1989). This is the second edition of the Maniatis 
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that described isolation of the murine (mouse) homologue of 
NAIL.97 
The Valiante patent disclosed the existence of a protein 
present on the surface of natural killer cells98 known only as 
p38, and claimed a monoclonal antibody specific for the 
protein.99 Valiante did not report the amino acid sequence of 
p38 or the DNA sequences encoding the protein.100 However, 
Valiante described a prophetic method to isolate p38 coding 
sequences using the antibody he had claimed.101 The 
claimants in Kubin used the Valiante method, as well as the 
Valiante antibody,102 to isolate the p38 coding sequences, 
which they then gave the more descriptive name NAIL.103 
In denying the claims, the Board invoked arguments 
parallel to those rejected by the Federal Circuit in Deuel. It 
held that the combined teachings of the prior art references 
rendered it obvious to attempt to clone the NAIL sequences 
even if the claimed product was not itself previously disclosed, 
and that the claimants had a reasonable expectation of 
success.104 In other words, the general availability of the 
method employed rendered the product obvious. The Board 
argued that there were a limited number of methodologies 
available to isolate the NAIL cDNA and that 
[t]he skilled artisan would have had reason to try these 
methodologies with the reasonable expectation that at least one 
would be successful. Thus, isolating NAIL cDNA was “the product 
not of innovation but of ordinary skill and common sense,” 
                                                          
manual. See supra, note 79. 
 97. Porunelloor Mathew et al., Cloning and Characterization of the 2B4 
Gene Encoding a Molecule Associated with Non- MHC-Restricted Killing 
Mediated by Activated Natural Killer Cells and T Cells, 151 J. IMMUNOLOGY 
5328 (1993). Ex parte Kubin, 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1412, 1415. 
 98. A natural killer cell is a type of lymphocyte (white blood cell) that 
mediates immune responses. See generally Kubin et al., supra note 8. 
 99. Ex parte Kubin, 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1412. 
 100. Id. at 1412–13. 
 101. Id. at 1412 (“Valiante expressly teaches through a prophetic 
example how to ‘isolat[e] the cDNA clone by using [mAb] C1.7, screening 
the protein expression in the cell transfected with the cDNA library and 
cloning a corresponding cDNA into a plasmid for sequencing.’”) 
(alterations in original). 
 102. mAb C1.7 was made commercially available by Valiante following 
issue of the patent. Id. at 1413. 
 103. Id. at 1411–12. 
 104. Id. at 1414–15. 
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leading us to conclude NAIL cDNA is not patentable as it would 
have been obvious to isolate it.105 
The Board considered it irrelevant that the Mathew 
reference taught away from the Kubin subject matter by 
reporting that there is no human homologue of NAIL.106 
Rather, it felt that the Mathew reference merely represented 
conflicting data in the field and would not deter a skilled 
artisan from pursuing the teachings of Valiante.107 In the 
words of the Board, “one of ordinary skill in the art would have 
recognized the value of isolating NAIL cDNA, and would have 
been motivated to apply conventional methodologies, such as 
those disclosed in Sambrook and utilized in Valiante, to do 
so.”108 
The Board invoked the language of KSR to support its 
ruling, principally, the Supreme Court’s statement that 
“obvious to try” is permissible grounds for rejection where 
there are available “a finite number of identified, predictable 
solutions” to a problem.109 Under KSR, the Board held, 
because the protein was already known in some form and 
there existed some method to isolate the corresponding gene, 
the isolated sequence was “the product not of innovation but of 
ordinary skill and common sense.”110 
In this first post-KSR ruling on obviousness in genetic 
innovation, the Board cited In re Deuel as being of questionable 
validity after KSR, and called for the Federal Circuit to overrule 
its precedent.111 The Board emphasized its stance in Ex parte 
Kubin by giving it the rare designation precedential.112 
The Federal Circuit affirmed rejection of the Kubin claims 
on obviousness grounds and endorsed the Board’s reasoning 
on the whole.113 The court held that the inventors’ reliance on 
                                                          
 105. Id. at 1414. 
 106. Id. at 1414–15. 
 107. Id. 
 108. Id. at 1413. 
 109. Id. at 1414 (quoting KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex, Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 
421 (2007)). 
 110. Id. 
 111. Id. 
 112. Ex parte Kubin is one of only three BPAI decisions to receive the 
designation in 2007. U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, BPAI Precedential 
Opinions, http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/dcom/bpai/prec.htm (last 
visited Mar. 11, 2009). 
 113. In re Kubin, No. 2008-1184, 2009 WL 877646 at *10 (Fed. Cir. 
Apr. 3, 2009). The court did not reach the merits of the § 112, ¶ 1 
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conventional methodology for isolating the NAIL coding 
sequence, together with a reasonable expectation of success, 
rendered the claimed product obvious.114 For the court, this 
was a two-step analysis. 
First, the court affirmed the Board’s findings that the 
Kubin methods were essentially the same as those in the prior 
art, and that the prior art references gave the claimants a 
reasonable expectation of success.115 At least, it would seem 
that is what the court intended to say. The argument is 
actually framed in the negative—the double negative. In the 
words of the court, 
[o]f note, the record nowhere suggests that the [prior art 
methods], even if slightly different than the technique disclosed in 
the claimed invention, would not yield the same polynucleotide 
claimed in [Kubin]. Stated directly, the record shows repeatedly 
that Valiante’s [method] produces for any person of ordinary skill 
in this art the claimed polynucleotide.116 
This unfortunate construction renders the argument 
logically precarious, but the court’s position is nonetheless 
clear: the Kubin methods are conventional methods well-
known in the prior art. The court found especially damning the 
claimants’ own admission that they had used “standard 
biochemical methods,”117 stating categorically that the 
claimants, “cannot represent to the public that their claimed 
gene sequence can be derived and isolated by ‘standard 
biochemical methods’ discussed in a well-known manual on 
cloning techniques, while at the same time discounting the 
relevance of that very manual to the obviousness of their 
claims.”118 
Like the Board, the court was selective in its application of 
the Mathew reference.119 Recall that Mathew described the 
                                                          
rejection. Id. Obviousness is a question of law based on underlying factual 
determinations. Graham v. John Deere Co. of Kan. City, 383 U.S. 1, 17 
(1966). The court reviews the Board’s factual determinations under the 
substantial evidence standard and its obviousness determinations 
without deference. In re Kubin, No. 2008-1184, 2009 WL 877646 at *4. 
 114. In re Kubin, No. 2008-1184, 2009 WL 877646 at *10. 
 115. Id. at *4. 
 116. Id. at *5 (emphasis added). 
 117. Id. (quoting U.S. Patent Application No. 09/667, 859 (filed Sept. 
20, 2000)). 
 118. Id. 
 119. See supra, note 97. 
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cloning of the murine 2B4 gene, unknown at the time to be a 
NAIL homologue, and reported incorrectly that there is no 
human homologue of the gene.120 The court held that while 
Mathew was valid for its demonstration of the “relative ease of 
deriving the claimed sequence from the prior art,” it was 
nonetheless insignificant that the reference taught away from 
the Kubin invention.121 Rather, the court held that 
Mathew’s quasi-agnostic stance toward the existence of a human 
homologue of the 2B4 gene cannot fairly be seen as dissuading 
one of ordinary skill in the art from combining Mathew’s 
teachings with those of Valiante. Rather, Mathew’s disclosure, in 
light of Valiante’s teachings regarding the p38 protein and its role 
in NK cell activation, would have aroused a skilled artisan’s 
curiosity to isolate the gene coding for p38.122 
Thus, the court held that there was sufficient evidence in 
the record to support a finding that the Kubin methods were 
conventional and well-known in the prior art, and that there 
was no significant disincentive for the inventors to pursue 
human NAIL isolation. 
The second step in the court’s analysis, the heart of the 
opinion, addressed the status of In re Deuel after KSR.123 The 
court began by discussing the aspects of Deuel relevant to this 
case, of which there are three. First, the holding that an amino 
acid sequence does not render the corresponding DNA 
sequence obvious per se.124 Second, that the method of DNA 
isolation is not relevant to nonobviousness of the sequence 
itself,125 even where the prior art includes a partial amino acid 
sequence.126 Third, that “obvious to try” is not an appropriate 
standard for obviousness determination, even where there is a 
                                                          
 120. Ex parte Kubin, 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1410, 1414 (B.P.A.I. 2007). 
 121. In re Kubin, No. 2008-1184, 2009 WL 877646 at *5. 
 122. Id. at *6. 
 123. See id. at *6–9. 
 124. Id. at *6 (“[K]nowledge of a protein does not give one a conception 
of a particular DNA encoding it.”) (quoting In re Deuel, 51 F.3d 1552, 1559 
(Fed. Cir. 1995)). 
 125. Id. at *7 (“[T]he existence of a general method of isolating cDNA or 
DNA molecules is essentially irrelevant to the question whether the 
specific molecules themselves would have been obvious, in the absence of 
other prior art that suggests the claimed DNAs. . . .”) (quoting In re Deuel, 
51 F.3d at 1559). 
 126. Id. at *6 (“In Deuel, this court reversed the Board’s conclusion that 
a prior art reference teaching a method of gene cloning, together with a 
reference disclosing a partial amino acid sequence of a protein, rendered 
DNA molecules encoding the protein obvious.”) (citing In re Deuel, 51 F.3d 
at 1559). 
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general incentive to undertake the work and general methods 
by which to proceed are known in the prior art.127 Under 
Deuel, the Kubin claims are undoubtedly permissible. The 
outcome of Kubin thus turns on whether Deuel was overruled 
by KSR, as the Board had held.128 
The Federal Circuit was emphatic in its position that some 
aspects of Deuel are no longer good law.129 The court cites KSR 
as having “unambiguously discredited” the implication of Deuel 
that “the obviousness inquiry cannot consider that the 
combination of the claim’s constituent elements was ‘obvious 
to try.’”130 The court pointed to the Supreme Court’s criticism 
of the Federal Circuit’s failure in Teleflex to consider whether a 
particular combination would have been obvious to try,131 and 
recited the language of KSR establishing that, “the fact that a 
combination was obvious to try might show that it was obvious 
under § 103.”132 
In perhaps a point of irony, the Federal Circuit explained 
that in striking down the standard of Deuel, the Supreme 
Court reinvigorated the standard of In re O’Farrell, a Federal 
Circuit decision issued seven years before Deuel.133 The court 
reiterated the view of O’Farrell that “obvious to try” is a 
guideline often misunderstood,134 and explained that while it is 
true that “obvious to try” is formally not the standard of § 103, 
an invention that is obvious under § 103 also would have been 
obvious to try.135 Thus, the critical question is “when is an 
invention that was obvious to try nevertheless nonobvious?”136 
The court identified two situations in which “obvious to 
                                                          
 127. Id. at *7 (“‘Obvious to try’ has long been held not to constitute 
obviousness. A general incentive does not make obvious a particular 
result, nor does the existence of techniques by which those efforts can be 
carried out.”) (quoting In re Deuel, 51 F.3d at 1559). 
 128. Ex parte Kubin, 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1410, 1414 (B.P.A.I. 2007). 
 129. In re Kubin, No. 2008-1184, 2009 WL 877646 at *7–8. 
 130. Id. 
 131. Id. (citing to Teleflex, Inc. v. KSR Int’l Co., 119 F. App’x 282, 289 
(Fed. Cir. 2005)). 
 132. Id. at *8 (quoting KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex, Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 421 
(2007)). 
 133. Id. (citing In re O’Farrell, 853 F.2d 894 (Fed. Cir. 1988)). 
 134. Id. 
 135. Id. (citing In re O’Farrell, 853 F.2d at 903). 
 136. Id. (quoting In re O’Farrell, 853 F.2d at 903). 
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try” does not equate to obviousness under § 103.137 First, 
where “what would have been ‘obvious to try’ would have been 
to vary all parameters or try each of numerous possible 
choices until one possibly arrived at a successful result,” but 
where there is no guidance from the prior art as to which 
combinations would be successful.138 In other words, a court 
should not find obviousness where the inventor “merely throws 
metaphorical darts at a board filled with combinatorial prior 
art possibilities.”139 The court drew support for this in KSR’s 
“finite number of identified, predictable solutions” standard, 
which it held to be the inverse of the O’Farrell exception.140 
The second exception is one in which an inventor explores 
a new technology or approach to innovation with only general 
guidance from the prior art.141 The court found support for 
this in KSR’s statement that § 103 bars patent protection 
unless “the improvement is more than the predictable use of 
prior art elements according to their established functions.”142 
Ultimately, the Federal Circuit found that neither of these 
conditions applied to the Kubin invention. The court held that 
because the prior art disclosed the protein of interest to the 
appellants, an antibody specific to the protein, and a general 
method for isolating the protein, the invention was obvious.143 
Moreover, the court endorsed the Board’s notion that there 
was in the biotechnology industry a general motivation to 
pursue the isolation of human NAIL, given the prior art 
teaching that p38 is “expressed on virtually all human NK cells 
and thus plays a role in the immune response.”144 The court 
declined to “cabin KSR to the ‘predictable arts’ (as opposed to 
the ‘unpredictable art’ of biotechnology),”145 holding that given 
the advanced level of skill in the art, the claimants had “every 
motivation to seek and every reasonable expectation of success 
                                                          
 137. Id. 
 138. Id. (quoting In re O’Farrell, 853 F.2d at 903). 
 139. Id. 
 140. Id. (quoting KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex, Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 421 
(2007)). 
 141. Id. (citing In re O’Farrell, 853 F.2d at 903). 
 142. Id. (quoting KSR Int’l, 550 U.S. at 417). 
 143. Id. at *9. 
 144. Id. (quoting Ex parte Kubin, 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1410, 1413 
(B.P.A.I. 2007). 
 145. Id. (parentheses in original). 
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in achieving the sequence of the claimed invention.”146 
In sum, In re Kubin overrules two of the three central 
elements of Deuel. The court did not hold that a DNA sequence 
is obvious per se where the protein is known in the prior art. 
However, it did hold that reliance on conventional methods 
may preclude patent protection where there is reasonable 
expectation of success, and that “obvious to try” is a valid 
consideration even for the unpredictable arts. 
II. IMPLICATIONS FOR THE BIOTECHNOLOGY INDUSTRY: 
OBVIOUSNESS IN THE POST-GENOMIC ERA 
A. LOST IN TRANSLATION: KSR IS GOOD FOR SOME, BUT NOT ALL 
The Federal Circuit’s ruling in Kubin is questionable on 
several levels,147 and the case serves as a platform for a 
discussion of the general inadequacies of KSR. To start, it is 
unclear to what extent the holding of KSR translates to 
biotechnology, or any non-mechanical art for that matter. Of 
course, the Supreme Court did not expressly limit the holding 
of KSR to any particular art. However, all but one of the cases 
                                                          
 146. Id. at *10. 
 147. Within days of the decision, a flurry of commentary by 
biotechnology patent practitioners sharply criticized several aspects of the 
ruling. See, e.g., Kevin Noonan, In re Kubin, PATENT DOCS BIOTECH. & 
PHARMA. PATENT LAW & NEWS BLOG, Apr. 6, 2009, 
http://www.patentdocs.org/articles_cases_obviousness/ (criticizing the 
Federal Circuit’s mishandling of the scientific elements of In re Kubin); 
Donna Young, Federal Circuit’s Patent Ruling Could Broadly Affect Biotech, 
BioWorld Today, Apr. 8, 2009, 
http://www.bioworld.com/servlet/com.accumedia.web.Dispatcher?next=
bioWorldHeadlines_article&forceid=50547 (reporting the views of patent 
practitioners as to the likely negative impact of In re Kubin); Patenly 
BIOtech, The Blunders of In re Kubin, Apr. 8, 2009, 
http://patentlybiotech.wordpress.com/2009/04/08/the-blunders-of-in-
re-kubin/ (criticizing generally the logic and scope of In re Kubin). But see 
Christopher Holman, In re Kubin: Federal Circuit Clarifies Obviousness 
Standard in Context of cDNA Cloning Invention, HOLMAN’S BIOTECH. IP 
BLOG, Apr. 6, 2009, 
http://holmansbiotechipblog.blogspot.com/2009/04/in-re-kubin-federal-
circuit-clarifies.html (arguing that the implications of In re Kubin for the 
biotechnology industry are not severe because of the unusual facts of the 
case); David Schwartz, Fed Circuit Ruling Extends KSR Logic to 
Biotechnology, THE TECH TRANSFER BLOG, Apr. 15, 2009, 
http://www.technologytransfertactics.com/content/2009/04/15/fed-
circuit-ruling-extends-ksr-logic-to-biotechnology/ (presenting a summary 
of opposing views as to the potential impact of In re Kubin). 
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the Court drew from involved the validity of mechanical 
patents. 
The Court relied principally on three of its precedents to 
refashion the standard for obviousness determination. United 
States v. Adams, a companion case to Graham, addressed the 
patentability of a non-rechargeable electrical battery.148 The 
Court cited to Adams for the proposition that when a patent 
claims a new combination of elements already known in the 
prior art, “the combination must do more than yield a 
predictable result.”149  Anderson’s-Black Rock, Inc. v. Pavement 
Salvage Co. involved an improved road-paving machine.150 The 
Court cited to Anderson’s for the proposition that to be 
nonobvious, combination devices must accomplish more than 
the individual components would do when operated 
sequentially.151 Sakraida v. Ag Pro, Inc. involved a water flush 
system for the removal of animal debris from the floor of a 
dairy barn.152 The Court cited to Sakraida for the proposition 
that a mere rearrangement of prior art elements that gives only 
predictable results is obvious and unpatentable.153 In all three 
of these cases, the inventions at issue were not only 
mechanical in nature, they were combination devices, as was 
the patent at issue in KSR. Precisely how this paradigm 
translates to novel biological molecules, such as in Kubin, is 
not at all clear. 
The only non-mechanical case cited directly in KSR is In re 
                                                          
 148. United States v. Adams, 383 U.S. 39, 40 (1966). 
 149. KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex, Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 416 (2007) (“The 
Court recognized that when a patent claims a structure already known in 
the prior art that is altered by the mere substitution of one element for 
another known in the field, the combination must do more than yield a 
predictable result.”) (citing Adams, 383 U.S. at 50–51). 
 150. Anderson’s-Black Rock, Inc. v. Pavement Salvage Co., 396 U.S. 
57, 58 (1969). 
 151. KSR Int’l, 550 U.S. at 417 (“The device, the Court concluded, did 
not create some new synergy: The radiant-heat burner functioned just as 
a burner was expected to function; and the paving machine did the same. 
The two in combination did no more than they would in separate, 
sequential operation.”) (citing Anderson’s, 396 U.S. at 60–62). 
 152. Sakraida v. Ag Pro, Inc., 425 U.S. 273, 281–82 (1976). 
 153. KSR Int’l, 550 U.S. at 417 (“[T]he Court derived from the 
precedents the conclusion that when a patent ‘simply arranges old 
elements with each performing the same function it had been known to 
perform’ and yields no more than one would expect from such an 
arrangement, the combination is obvious.”) (quoting Sakraida, 425 U.S. at 
282). 
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Deuel.154 The Court’s pronouncement that a finding of 
obviousness is appropriate where there exists “a finite number 
of identified, predictable solutions”155 is centered on rejection 
of the Deuel holding that “‘[o]bvious to try’ has long been held 
not to constitute obviousness.”156 In Ex parte Kubin, the Board 
focused on this language and on the opportunity to treat Deuel 
as no longer valid.157 In doing so, however, the Board handily 
re-crafted the language of KSR to fit the facts of Kubin. 
In KSR, the Court stated that, “[w]hen there is a design 
need or market pressure to solve a problem and there are a 
finite number of identified, predictable solutions . . . . the fact 
that a combination was obvious to try might show that it was 
obvious under § 103.”158 However, the Board’s version of this 
holding reads, “[w]hen there is motivation to solve a problem 
and there are a finite number of identified, predictable 
solutions . . . .”159 Under KSR, large-scale market forces such 
as industry or consumer demands for the correction of design 
flaws may serve as a predicate for a finding of obviousness.160 
Under the Board’s view, it would seem that any motivation to 
solve a problem equates to these large-scale forces. As the 
Board explained in Kubin, “[t]he ‘problem’ facing those in the 
art was to isolate NAIL cDNA, and there were a limited number 
of methodologies available to do so.”161 The Board refers to 
                                                          
 154. A second biotechnology case, Alza Corp. v. Mylan Labs., Inc., 464 
F.3d 1286 (Fed. Cir. 2006), was cited in recognition that the Federal 
Circuit had broadened its application of the TSM test even before the 
writing of KSR, id. at 421–22, but did not contribute substantively to the 
holding of the Court. 
 155. Id. See also supra note 50 and accompanying text. 
 156. Id. at 414 (quoting Teleflex, Inc. v. KSR Int’l. Co., 119 F. App’x 
282, 289 (Fed. Cir. 2005), rev’d, 550 U.S. 398 (quoting In re Deuel, 51 
F.3d 1552, 1559 (Fed. Cir. 1995)) (alteration in original). 
 157. At least one USPTO official has acknowledged the agency’s 
dissatisfaction with the holding of Deuel, stating that USPTO examiners 
were “startled that the [Federal Circuit] would have said this was not 
obvious.”  Eli Kintisch, Patent Experts Hope High Court will Clarify What’s 
Obvious, 314 SCIENCE 1230–31 (2006) (quoting Esther Kepplinger, a 
supervisor of the biotechnology examiner corps at the time the Deuel 
application was filed). 
 158. KSR Int’l, 550 U.S. at 421 (emphasis added). 
 159. Ex parte Kubin, 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1410, 1415 (B.P.A.I. 2007) 
(emphasis added). 
 160. See KSR Int’l, 550 U.S. at 417. 
 161. Ex parte Kubin, 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1414. 
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NAIL isolation as facing those in the art, but in fact it was the 
problem facing these artisans. The Board attributed the 
individual motivation of these claimants to the whole of the 
biotechnology industry in order to find a market pressure and 
suggest the researchers were essentially passive in deciding 
whether and how to pursue NAIL isolation. It is more than a 
little disturbing that the Federal Circuit endorsed this 
reasoning.162 This broad interpretation of KSR is literally 
without bounds, as presumably all work is undertaken with 
some kind of motivation. 
The distortion of this aspect of KSR speaks to the 
vagueness of the holding. What is a market pressure? What is 
a design need? How large a segment of the market must have 
the need?  How must the need be expressed? In KSR, need and 
pressure took the form of a contract for services by a dominant 
American auto manufacturer,163 an easy example. How this 
translates to other industries is impossible to say without more 
concrete definitions of these fundamental concepts. Does the 
fact that many people die each year from cancer create a 
market pressure to discover new treatments? Under a strict 
reading of Kubin, the answer may be yes. 
The Federal Circuit’s view that the use of known 
methodologies renders the NAIL cDNA obvious is equally 
misguided. KSR refers to the use of known methodologies only 
in the context of improvements to mechanical devices, stating: 
When a work is available in one field of endeavor, design 
incentives and other market forces can prompt variations of it, 
either in the same field or a different one. If a person of ordinary 
skill can implement a predictable variation, § 103 likely bars its 
patentability. For the same reason, if a technique has been used to 
improve one device, and a person of ordinary skill in the art would 
recognize that it would improve similar devices in the same way, 
using the technique is obvious unless its actual application is 
beyond his or her skill.164 
The Court cites to Anderson’s and Sakraida as illustrative 
of this holding,165 which, as described above, related to 
mechanical combination devices.166 In both cases, the 
technique for improvement was the joining of prior art 
                                                          
 162. In re Kubin, No. 2008-1184, 2009 WL 877646 at *9–10 (Fed. Cir. 
Apr. 3, 2009). 
 163. KSR Int’l, 550 U.S. at 409–10. 
 164. Id. at 417 (emphasis added). 
 165. Id. 
 166. See supra, notes 150–153 and accompanying text. 
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elements that previously existed only separately. The 
Anderson’s patent combined on one chassis a radiant heat 
burner, a pavement spreader, and a leveling device.167 The 
Sakraida patent combined prior art water storage tanks, 
means for rapid water release, and drains positioned at the low 
end of a sloped floor to create a system for flushing debris from 
the floor of a barn.168 Likewise, the technique in question in 
KSR was to combine known pedal elements that had not been 
joined in the prior art.169 None of these scenarios involves the 
use of existing methods to derive something new, as in Kubin. 
The obvious-by-methodology argument also conflates two 
aspects of the KSR holding. The first, described immediately 
above, is that the use of known methods to improve known 
elements is obvious.170 The second is that obviousness may be 
found where there is a finite number of possible solutions.171 
The Board split the difference between these statements to find 
obviousness where there are “a limited number of 
methodologies available,”172 and the Federal Circuit endorsed 
this position without comment. There is an important 
difference between these views, however. The claims at issue in 
KSR address a design need in the automotive industry where 
the solution (of which there are a finite number) is the claimed 
device. By contrast, in Kubin, the method (of which there are a 
limited number) is the means to obtain the claimed device. 
Under Kubin, the pedal assembly in KSR would be held 
obvious not because of the design itself, but because there are 
a limited number of ways to cast the metal used to make the 
device. This approach runs contrary to the language of § 103, 
which states that “[p]atentability shall not be negatived by the 
manner in which the invention was made.”173 Recall that this 
language was included to quash the flash of genius standard 
announced by the Supreme Court in Cuno.174 The very essence 
                                                          
 167. Anderson’s-Black Rock, Inc. v. Pavement Salvage Co., 396 U.S. 
57, 58 (1969). 
 168. Sakraida v. Ag Pro, Inc., 425 U.S. 273, 281–82 (1976). 
 169. KSR Int’l, 550 U.S. at 406. 
 170. Id. at 417; see also supra note 164 and accompanying text. 
 171. See id. at 421; see also supra note 50, 56, and accompanying text. 
 172. Ex parte Kubin, 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1410, 1414 (B.P.A.I. 2007) 
(emphasis added). 
 173. United States Patent Act, 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) (2006). 
 174. See supra note 25.  
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of this provision is that the focus of an obviousness inquiry 
should be the product of the inventive effort, not the means 
employed by the inventor. The Federal Circuit would have 
inventors disavow proven technologies in favor of re-inventing 
the wheel, so to speak, in order to withstand an obviousness 
determination. Not only would this be inefficient and socially 
wasteful, it may not always be possible to devise novel 
methods, especially in highly technical fields. In In re Kubin, 
the court made a point of the fact that the claimants cited to 
the “very same cloning manual” as the Valiante reference.175 
What the court failed to appreciate is that both cited to 
Sambrook/Maniatis because it was the only manual of any 
repute, to which any molecular biologist can attest. 
The reasoning of In re Kubin illustrates the shortcomings 
of KSR, which is both too narrowly tailored to translate easily 
to other disciplines and sufficiently vague on key elements to 
yield little guidance as to their meaning.  On the whole, KSR is 
unsatisfying as the Supreme Court’s first declaration on the 
issue in over forty years.  A common sense approach is 
inadequate to address this difficult question of law when 
applied to biological science. Nonetheless, together KSR and 
Kubin raise interesting and difficult questions regarding 
nonobviousness standards in biotechnology as it exists today. 
Standards implemented by the Federal Circuit in the 
industry’s infancy are coming under increased scrutiny and 
have perhaps been outgrown by advances in the art. 
B. LIFE ON PLANET EARTH: THE REALITIES OF BIOTECHNOLOGY 
Some scholars have criticized In re Bell and In re Deuel as 
overindulgent to the biotechnology industry, arguing that 
knowledge of a protein sequence is sufficient to render the 
corresponding gene sequence obvious to a person of skill in the 
art.176 However, this criticism fails to consider the relevant 
                                                          
 175. In re Kubin, No. 2008-1184, 2009 WL 877646 at *9 (Fed. Cir. Apr. 
3, 2009) (emphasis in original). 
 176. See, e.g., Harold C. Wegner, Chemical and Biotechnology 
Obviousness in a State of Flux, 26 BIOTECH. L. REP. 437, 459–60 (2007) 
(criticizing the Federal Circuit’s approach to biotechnology obviousness 
and calling for “death to the holding in Deuel.”); Harold C. Wegner, Deuel 
Death to “Motivation”: Whither KSR and Kahn 9 (Apr. 21, 2006), 
http://www.foley.com/files/tbl_s31Publications/FileUpload137/3349/KS
RDeuelDeath.pdf (criticizing the holdings of Bell and Deuel; referring to 
the holding of Deuel as a “deviant standard for biotechnology”). But see 
Andrew V. Trask, Note, “Obvious to Try”: A Proper Patentability Standard 
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facts on which an obviousness determination is based for 
genetic innovation—the biological facts. 
It is indisputable that DNA and proteins are fundamentally 
related, and that their interrelatedness is largely stable and 
reproducible.177 Were this not true, genetic engineering as it 
exists today would not be possible. However, as illustrated in 
Fig. 2, a one-to-one codon-to-amino acid correlation simply 
does not exist. Some amino acids are specified by as many as 
six different codons.178 From an evolutionary standpoint, 
degeneracy of the genetic code is a good thing, because it 
allows for small mistakes in codon sequence to occur without 
altering the corresponding protein sequence, which could have 
a devastating result for the viability of a cell.179 From a 
molecular biologist’s standpoint, however, degeneracy is a 
barrier to predicting gene sequence based solely on protein 
sequence. For even the smallest of proteins, there are simply 
too many possible coding sequences to make feasible a trial 
and error approach.180 This is precisely why geneticists have 
developed various other means to clone genes. It is also the 
reason the Federal Circuit was quick to re-tool KSR’s “finite 
number of identified, predictable solutions” standard to one 
that encompasses an “easily traversed, small and finite 
number of alternatives.”181 True, it is possible to tabulate all 
the possible gene sequences, one of which is correct. However, 
it is not possible to predict which is correct based solely on 
protein sequence. Regardless of the legal implications of Deuel, 
the Federal Circuit got the science right. 
From an industry standpoint, the holding of Deuel was 
important because it respected the historical progression of life 
science research. Scientists had begun to characterize proteins 
                                                          
in the Pharmaceutical Arts?, 76 FORDHAM L. REV. 2625, 2632–36 (2008) 
(arguing that unpredictability is simply a reality of the biotechnology and 
pharmaceutical arts and that “obvious to try” is not an appropriate 
standard for those industries; arguing that KSR does not permit courts to 
deny patents in these arts on the basis that the innovation was obvious to 
try). 
 177. See generally GRIFFITHS ET AL., supra note 60. 
 178. Id. 
 179. For example, note the similarity of the codons that specify leucine 
(leu) shown in Fig. 2. They are: AAT, AAC, GAC, GAT, GAG, GAA, Reading 
the codons in sequence, only a single base differs one to the next. 
 180. See supra notes 62 and 63 and accompanying text. 
 181. See supra notes 56–58 and accompanying text. 
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in great detail182 long before it was known that DNA is the 
genetic material,183 much less how it is that DNA encodes 
protein products. Until relatively recently, it was the norm for 
proteins to be characterized in some form and at least partially 
sequenced before the corresponding gene was cloned, just as a 
practical matter.184 If protein sequences were held to render 
gene sequences obvious, entire fields of genetic research would 
have been precluded from patent protection by protein 
chemistry done years (or decades) before recombinant DNA 
technology even existed. 
Nevertheless, one aspect of the Bell–Deuel standard may 
be vulnerable. While the Bell court held that protein sequences 
do not render gene sequences obvious, it explicitly reserved 
judgment on whether the converse is also true—whether DNA 
sequences render proteins obvious.185 At the time, prior to the 
release of the first completed genomes,186 so-called forward 
                                                          
 182. E.g., Linus Pauling et al., The Structure of Proteins: Two Hydrogen-
bonded Helical Configurations of the Polypeptide Chain, 37 PROC. NAT’L. 
ACAD. SCI. 205 (1951); Linus Pauling & Carl Niemann, The Structure of 
Proteins, 61 J. AM. CHEMICAL SOC’Y 1860 (1939); Alfred E. Mirsky & Linus 
Pauling, On the Structure of Native, Denatured, and Coagulated Proteins, 
22 PROC. NAT’L. ACAD. SCI. 439 (1936). 
 183. Alfred D. Hershey & Martha Chase, Independent Functions of Viral 
Protein and Nucleic Acid in Growth of Bacteriophage, 36 J. GEN. 
PHYSIOLOGY 39 (1952). 
 184. Consider the history of the characterization of insulin, for 
example. The protein was physically isolated from cellular extracts in 
1921, the amino acid sequence was determined in 1953, and the human 
gene was sequenced in 1980. Quite literally, the techniques used to 
sequence the amino acid were not in existence at the time the protein was 
first identified. Moreover, when the protein was sequenced in 1953, it was 
not yet widely accepted that DNA is the genetic material. Graeme I. Bell et 
al., Sequence of the Human Insulin Gene, 284 NATURE 26 (1980); Frederick 
Sanger & E.O.P. Thompson, The Amino-acid Sequence in the Glycyl Chain 
of Insulin: 1. The Identification of Lower Peptides from Partial Hydrolysates, 
53 BIOCHEMICAL J. 353 (1953); Frederick Sanger & E.O.P. Thompson, The 
Amino-acid Sequence in the Glycyl Chain of Insulin: 2. The Investigation of 
Peptides from Enzymic Hydrolysates, 53 BIOCHEMICAL J. 366 (1953); 
Fredrick G. Banting, Nobel Lecture Delivered at Stockholm on September 
15th, 1925: Diabetes and Insulin (Sept. 15, 1925). 
 185. In re Bell, 991 F.2d 781, 785 n.6 (Fed. Cir. 1993); see also supra 
note 74 and accompanying text. 
 186. The first complete genome sequenced was that of Haemophilus 
influenzae, released in 1995. Robert D. Fleischmann et al., Whole-Genome 
Random Sequencing and Assembly of Haemophilus influenzae Rd, 269 
SCIENCE 496 (1995). The first eukaryotic genome to be completed was 
Saccharomyces cerevisiae (yeast), released in 1996. André Goffeau et al., 
Life With 6000 Genes, 274 SCIENCE 546 (1996). The first multicellular 
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reading of genetic information—DNA to protein—was 
uncommon. The court could afford to reserve judgment then, 
but perhaps no longer. Genomic data (partial or complete) are 
publicly available for hundreds of species, with more on the 
way.187 The information is of course invaluable to genetic 
researchers, but it may be the elephant in the room from the 
standpoint of patentability of proteins. The reason is that, as 
illustrated in Figs. 1 and 2, forward reading of genomic 
sequence is straightforward.188 Quite literally, anyone with a 
table of the genetic code could translate coding sequence to 
protein sequence.189 It is precisely because DNA, RNA, and 
proteins have discernable relationships that biotechnology 
research has progressed as far as it has. This is a central 
element of modern medicine and is the basis for breakthrough 
therapies such as recombinant human insulin (an old 
example) and gene replacement therapy (a new example).190 
On one hand, it is inconsistent to invoke the realities of 
biology to argue that reverse reading is not obvious, and then 
avoid the converse reality because it is inconvenient. On the 
other hand, to hold that forward reading is obvious would 
radically alter the landscape of biotechnology patenting. Whole 
classes of biological molecules—mRNAs and proteins—would 
be removed from the patent arena overnight, and scores of 
issued patents would be brought into crisis. The public stores 
of knowledge would also be negatively affected as industry 
players resort to trade secret practice to protect new 
developments. Industry analysts also argue that the subjective 
obviousness analysis of KSR will stem the flow of money into 
                                                          
eukaryotic genome completed was that of Caenorhabditis elegans, 
released in 1998. C. elegans Sequencing Consortium, Genome Sequence of 
the Nematode C. elegans: A Platform for Investigating Biology, 282 SCIENCE 
2012 (1998). 
 187. Genbank is an annotated collection of all publicly available DNA 
sequences maintained by the National Institutes of Health. It is available 
for searching at http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/Genbank/. See Dennis A . 
Benson, et al., GenBank, 36 NUCLEIC ACIDS RES. D25 (2008). 
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the industry, something of particular importance to 
biotechnology because research and development is so 
costly.191 
C. INDUSTRY-TOLERANT OBVIOUSNESS STANDARDS 
One thing made clear by KSR and Kubin is that generic 
obviousness standards do not translate well to biotechnology. 
It is implausible to equate biological science with the 
automotive industry, as artisans in these fields face radically 
different challenges. An obvious solution would be to address 
the needs of specific industries directly and separately from 
those of other industries. As some scholars point out, when 
the uniform patent system was adopted, inventive efforts in 
this country were predominantly mechanical in nature, and 
were far more homogeneous than today.192 With the emergence 
of new technologies such as biotechnology, computer hardware 
and software, electronics, and semiconductors, uniform rules 
are no longer appropriate or adequate.193 
Some proponents of industry-tolerant patentability 
standards argue that courts already enforce differential 
standards across industries.194 Burk and Lemley argue that 
the Federal Circuit has responded to the needs of new 
technologies by applying the uniform rules in a manner that 
effectively creates industry-specific standards.195 Through 
close case analysis the authors demonstrate, for example, that 
the Federal Circuit enforces a much stricter written description 
requirement196 in biotechnology than in other industries,197 
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United States Patent System, 82 B.U. L. REV. 77, 134–38 (2002). 
 193. Id. at 142–44. 
 194. See generally Sean B. Seymore, Heightened Enablement in the 
Unpredictable Arts, 56 UCLA L. REV. 127 (2008); Dan L. Burk, 
Biotechnology in the Federal Circuit: A Clockwork Lemon, 46 ARIZ. L. REV. 
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while permitting a lowered standard for nonobviousness.198 
Conversely, the computer software industry enjoys minimal 
enablement and best mode requirements,199 and a more 
stringent nonobviousness standard.200 
Opponents argue that industry-tolerant standards will be 
administratively burdensome,201 and prone to erosion.202 
However, it is not clear why an explicit standard would be any 
more prone to erosion than the ad hoc judicial approach 
currently in place. If anything, an unambiguous standard 
should be more resistant than the stop-gap measures of the 
Federal Circuit. Regarding the administrative burden, the 
United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) already 
operates an industry-specific examiner corps.203 
Implementation of industry-tolerant standards could be as 
straightforward as revising examination guidelines to reflect 
the new practice. The real burden would be in conducting an 
initial study of the issue and drafting recommended guidelines. 
However, there is likely no shortage of biotechnology industry 
advocates willing to contribute to the process. Critics of the 
USPTO may argue that the agency struggles to enforce 
statutory requirements as it is, and that introducing non-
uniform standards would only complicate matters further. If 
anything, however, that argument speaks to the need to reform 
                                                          
forth the best mode contemplated by the inventor of carrying out 
his invention.  Id.  
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elucidating controls that would guard against the dissolution of [industry-
specific standards] and thereby maintain some level of systematic 
coherence.”). 
 203. See, e.g., U.S. Pat. & Trademark Off., Patent Examiner Positions, 
http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/pac/exam.htm (last visited Mar. 16, 
2009). 
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standards. If Bell, Deuel, and Kubin are any indication, it 
would seem that the problem lies not in the relative complexity 
of the standard, but in the fact that examiners are required to 
apply uniform standards to vastly different technologies, and 
the fit is often poor. The reality is that legal standards for 
obviousness are rooted in the practical considerations of 
invention. Practically speaking, it seems obvious that wet 
batteries, pavement spreaders, and manure flushers—
combination mechanical devices—should be viewed through a 
slightly different lens than novel biological molecules designed 
to improve our collective health and well-being. 
III. CONCLUSION 
Biotechnology in the post-genomic era is an exceedingly 
advanced industry, and is growing more so every year. Genetic 
innovation is a central component of modern medicine and it is 
in the public interest to foster industry advances wherever 
possible. Adequate patent protection is an important counter-
balance to the enormous risk and expense of biotechnological 
undertakings, but current obviousness standards are poised to 
fail the industry. 
The Supreme Court’s reformulation of obviousness 
determination in KSR is inadequate to address the needs of 
varied modern industries, the highly technical arts in 
particular. While the Court purported to set forth a generic 
standard, broadly applicable to the patentable arts, it crafted a 
standard that is too narrow and too vague to be of use 
generally. A strict reading of KSR would revoke patent 
protection for innovations that are standard in the 
biotechnology industry, as illustrated by the Board’s 
mechanical application of KSR in Ex parte Kubin. 
Obviousness standards that tolerate the realities of 
biotechnology research are necessary to foster continued 
investment in the industry and the dissemination of research 
data to the public. Standards that parallel the Federal Circuit’s 
pre-KSR biotechnology jurisprudence would promote the 
public interest in advancing high-level research while 
maintaining reasonable standards for patentability. 
 
